Prima Quran

“O believers, if an evildoer brings you any news, verify so you do not harm people unknowingly, becoming regretful for what you have done.” (Qur’an 49:6)

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In Islamic jurisprudence, khabar al-āhād (solitary report) is a narration that does not reach the level of mutawatir (mass transmission). In terms of its epistemic value, it is generally considered dhannī (probabilistic/speculative) rather than qat’i (absolutely certain).

What has happened is that we as Muslims have not done a great job in explaining why do we accept the lone narrator reports in jurisprudence?

It is very clear on why we do not accept the lone narrator reports in matters of theology.

Shaykh Massoud bin Mohammed al Miqbali (h) he made this very clear in his lecture here:

This has lead many Muslims to have an inconsistent epistemology. Where one will take the word of people as given for practically all facets of life. However, the same one will be skeptical or outright reject the words of the Blessed Prophet (saw).

The khabar al-āhād (solitary report) yields epistemic probability, and they do not yeild absolute certainty (qat’i).

This khabar al-āhād (solitary report)is further broken down into three categories:

Gharib (strange/scarce): Narrated by only a single reporter at every point in the chain.

Aziz (rare/strong): Narrated by exactly two people at every point in the chain.

Mashur (well-known): Narrated by at least three to nine people at every point in the chain.

Now coming back to the word dhannī. This means that there is a probability of it being true and a probability of it not being true.

This is why honesty and integrity are very important in Islam. It is why lying is a major sin in Islam.

In fact, every society at every level values honesty and integrity within individuals.

The Qur’an gives us qat’i (decisive text) that informs the Muslims that we are to rely upon dhannī in testimonies and as witness.

“The month of Ramadan is the month in which the Quran was revealed; a guide for the people, the most authoritative of all guidance and a criteria to discern right from wrong. Anyone from among you knows that the month of Ramadan has begun, he must start to fast. Those who are sick or on a journey have to fast the same number of days at another time. Allah does not impose any hardship upon you. He wants you to have comfort so that you may complete the fast, glorify Allah for His having given you guidance, and that, perhaps, you would give Him thanks.” (Qur’an 2:185)

The basis for begining out fasting in the month of Ramadan is on the report of a single witness.

“O believers! When you contract a loan for a fixed period of time, commit it to writing. Let the scribe maintain justice between the parties. The scribe should not refuse to write as Allah has taught them to write. They will write what the debtor dictates, bearing Allah in mind and not defrauding the debt. If the debtor is incompetent, weak, or unable to dictate, let their guardian dictate for them with justice. Call upon two of your men to witness. If two men cannot be found, then one man and two women of your choice will witness—so if one of the women forgets the other may remind her. The witnesses must not refuse when they are summoned. You must not be against writing for a fixed period—whether the sum is small or great. This is more just in the sight of Allah, and more convenient to establish evidence and remove doubts. However, if you conduct an immediate transaction among yourselves, then there is no need for you to record it, but call upon witnesses when a deal is finalized. Let no harm come to the scribe or witnesses. If you do, then you have gravely exceeded the bounds. Be mindful of Allah, for Allah teaches you. And Allah has knowledge of all things.” (Qur’an 2:282)

“O believers! When death approaches any of you, call upon two just Muslim men to witness as you make a bequest; otherwise, two non-Muslims if you are afflicted with death while on a journey. If you doubt, keep them after prayer and let them testify under oath, “By Allah! We would never sell our testimony for any price, even in favour of a close relative, nor withhold the testimony of Allah. Otherwise, we would surely be sinful.” (Qur’an 5:106)

“And those who accuse chaste women and then do not produce four witnesses – lash them with eighty lashes and do not accept from them testimony ever after. And those are the defiantly disobedient.” (Qur’an 24:4)

“And those who accuse their wives [of adultery] and have no witnesses except themselves – then the witness of one of them [shall be] four testimonies [swearing] by Allah that indeed, he is of the truthful. And the fifth [oath will be] that the curse of Allah be upon him if he should be among the liars. But it will prevent punishment from her if she gives four testimonies [swearing] by Allah that indeed, he is of the liars. And the fifth [oath will be] that the wrath of Allah be upon her if he was of the truthful.” (Qur’an 24:6-9)

“Then when they have reached the end of their waiting period, either retain them honourably or separate from them honourably. And call two of your reliable men to witness and bear true testimony for Allah. This is enjoined on whoever has faith in Allah and the Last Day. And whoever is mindful of Allah, He will make a way out for them.” (Qur’an 65:2)

“O  believers! Do not kill game while on pilgrimage. Whoever kills game intentionally must compensate by offering its equivalence as judged by two just men among you to be offered at the Sacred House, or by feeding the needy, or by fasting so that they may taste the consequences of their violations. Allah has forgiven what has been done. But those who persist will be punished by Allah. And Allah is Almighty, capable of punishment.” (Qur’an 5:95)

“And if you fear dissension between the two, send an arbitrator from his people and an arbitrator from her people. If they both desire reconciliation, Allah will cause it between them. Indeed, Allah is ever Knowing and Acquainted with all things.” (Qur’an 4:35)

We will translate one section that is relevant for our discussion here. We will also translate the full discussion on the other matters as well.

“One of the rationalists comes and says: “Here you are, differing regarding such hadiths. The meaning of these hadiths is not correct; they indicate conjecture (dhann), as some have said, and conjecture is not acted upon.” Fine, conjecture is not acted upon. Meaning that it could be correct in one possibility, or it could be incorrect. So this also means he would not act upon the Qur’an in many matters, regarding the commands and prohibitions of the Qur’an. Allah, blessed and exalted, has commanded us in explicit text to accept the testimony of two just witnesses in judgment: “And bring to witness two just men from among you”. This is a definitive Qur’anic text. He says: Yes, this is definitive in the Qur’an. Fine, but if we come to application: suppose someone claims let’s say, the phone is broken, or in my estimation, this pen is yours. Okay, if this person stands up and takes this pen in his hand and says, “Ustadh Khalid said this is my pen,” then fine — bring two witnesses. He brings two witnesses, and the judge rules based on these two witnesses because they are just, according to what he sees either through his personal knowledge of them or through their being vouched for. Is this ruling definitive? Is it definitive or not? As for the fact that he rules by the testimony of two just witnesses, that is definitive from the Qur’an. That he is commanded to judge by the testimony of two just witnesses. But is the justice of these two men definitively established? It can never be definitively established. A judge can never be certain about any person. I said to him: We do not have definitive certainty regarding anyone’s testimony of course, except for the prophets and messengers. And he says what does he say? That no one’s testimony can be definitively affirmed. Allah, blessed and exalted, has poured the meaning into its molds, and it is not my fault if the cows do not understand. So we told him: In application, we cannot be certain that so-and-so is such-and-such. We do not say that the ummah has no just people. The ummah has just people. But when you want to rule based on the testimony of two just witnesses, fine. In terms of application, this is conjecture (dhann). So if you rule by conjecture, fine. What about prayers? If a person does not know the direction of the qiblah, and one, two, or three people come and tell him the qiblah is this way, for example — is he certain of their statement?” -Shaykh Saeed bin Mabrouk Al-Qanubi (h).

“Fine, they say it is established. For example, two people even regarding the differences of opinion among scholars if two just witnesses testify to the sighting of the crescent for the beginning or end of Ramadan, it is established. Fine, two just witnesses testify to seeing the crescent on the day of doubt. Fasting is prohibited on that day, and on the day of Eid, fasting is prohibited. Does he accept their testimony and fast or break his fast? Yes. Fine, the fast of Ramadan is established by definitive evidence. Yes, “The month of Ramadan in which the Qur’an was revealed.” Fine, is he certain of the truthfulness of the two just witnesses? He is not certain of their truthfulness. Likewise, in matters of rights, and in many matters of purification. If, for example, someone knows that his garment was affected by impurity, and a just person tells him, “I have washed it,” is he certain that it has been washed? He is not certain, but he is not required to be certain in such matters. Testimonies cut off hands, and even cut off heads. Fine. And one follows according to the known rulings you have. Fine, by the testimony of two just witnesses, a person does not have certainty. A man marries a woman, saying “I married you,” and so-and-so and so-and-so testify that she is his wife. Fine, he then permits himself to look at her, touch her, have marital relations, and the children are his children, and he inherits from her and she from him, and all the other known rulings. And if he divorces, likewise the known rulings, and rulings on dhihar, manumission, and other matters the testimony of just witnesses all of these are conjectural (dhanniyyah). The underlying principles are definitive, but in terms of establishment and application, they are conjectural. So how can they apply such matters if they wanted to?”-Shaykh Saeed bin Mabrouk Al-Qanubi (h).

Based on the information provided in the text, the Shaykh is making the following implications for Islamic jurisprudence regarding the use of khabar al-āhād (solitary/lone-narrator reports) and dhannī (speculative) evidence:

The Qur’anic Foundation: Certainty of Source vs. Certainty of Application

The Shaykh establishes a crucial distinction:

• Definitive textual sources (e.g., the Qur’anic command to accept the testimony of two just witnesses – “And bring to witness two just men from among you”), which are qaṭ’ī (definitive and certain) in their textual authenticity.
• The practical application of that text, which is dhannī (speculative/conjectural) because it depends on human factors. Such as verifying the actual justice (‘adālah) of the two witnesses in a given case.

The key insights: Even when the source is certain (the Qur’an), the application in any particular case is always conjectural (dhannī). A judge can never be 100% certain that the two witnesses before him are truly just. He acts on outward indications.

Therefore, certainty in the source does not translate into certainty in the ruling derived from that particular application.

His point: Even when the source is certain, the implementation is always conjectural. A judge can never be 100% certain that the two witnesses before him are truly just; he only acts on outward indications (personal knowledge or external vouching). Therefore, certainty in the source does not translate into certainty in the ruling derived from that particular application.

The Practical Necessity Argument

Many everyday legal rulings cannot be established through mass-transmitted reports alone:

• Details of prayer
• Transaction rules
• Family law
• Purification rules

Without accepting khabar al-āhād, the legal system would lack guidance on most practical matters.

Despite being dhannī (speculative and fallible), the shaykh argues that such evidence is fully actionable in Islamic law. He gives multiple examples where even definitive rulings (like the obligation of Ramadan fasting, the prohibition of fasting on Eid, marriage, divorce, inheritance, purification of clothes, and even capital punishments) are implemented based on the testimony of two witnesses. Yet no one claims absolute certainty about the witnesses’ truthfulness.

Speculative Evidence is Sufficient for Action in Practice

The implication: Islamic jurisprudence does not require qaṭ’ (absolute certainty) for every ruling in practice. Conjecture (dhann), when based on valid legal mechanisms (like witness testimony), is legally sufficient and binding, even though it carries the possibility of error.

The Argument from Consistency (Reductio ad Absurdum)

Rejecting Speculative Hadith Would Lead to the Collapse of the Legal System

The shaykh uses this analogy to answer the rationalist who dismisses āhād hadiths because they are dhannī and “conjecture is not acted upon.” The shaykh turns this argument on its head:

“If you refuse to act on dhann in the case of hadith, then you must also refuse to act on dhann in all these other areas of Islamic law (testimony, prayer direction, purification, marriage, etc.).”

Since that is impossible and would render the entire legal system unworkable, the implication is clear:

Speculative evidence (dhann) is not only acceptable in Islamic jurisprudence, it is unavoidable and integral to the functioning of the law.

The Distinction Between Theology and Jurisprudence

Why take the dhanni in jurisprudence but not take the dhanni in theology?

Rationale: Matters of belief require certainty because they concern eternal salvation; legal rulings concern worldly actions where probability is acceptable for practical and pragmatic purposes.

The Real Issue is Not Epistemological Certainty but Legal Reliability

The shaykh implies that the proper criterion for accepting khabar al-āhād is not whether it yields qaṭ’ (certainty), but whether it meets the juridical standards of reliability (ṭhrāq al-dhann – giving a strong/overwhelming presumption of correctness).

Just as a judge accepts testimony based on outward justice without penetrating the inner conscience of the witnesses, scholars accept āhād reports based on established criteria of narrators’ reliability, without requiring absolute knowledge of their inner truthfulness.

Summary of the Implication:

The shaykh is arguing that the dhannī (speculative) nature of khabar al-āhād does not disqualify it from being a valid source of evidence in Islamic jurisprudence. On the contrary, most legal rulings in practice operate on dhann. Including those derived from the Qur’an when applied through human testimony.

To reject āhād reports on the grounds that they are merely probable would be inconsistent, because it would require rejecting the vast majority of Islamic legal rulings that are themselves implemented on the basis of probability, not certainty. Thus, speculative evidence is legally authoritative (ḥujjah) in action, even if it falls short of absolute epistemological certainty.

The Role of Human Fallibility

The Shaykh emphasizes that narrators are fallible:

• They may forget.
• They may err in retention.
• They may have misunderstood.
• They may have narrated before abrogation.
• Their opinions may contradict their narrations.

Examples given:

• ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab(ra) forgot the tayammum incident.
• Ibn ‘Abbas (ra and others differed on narrations.
• Scholars may reject a narration due to hidden defects (‘ilal).

The Methodology of Evaluating Ahad Reports

The Shaykh outlines how ahad reports are evaluated for jurisprudence:

1. Examine the chain – Is it continuous? Are narrators trustworthy?
2. Examine the text – Does it contradict established principles?
3. Consider abrogation – Was it early or late in revelation?
4. Consider interpretation – Is the apparent meaning intended?
5. Check for consensus – Has the ummah agreed on the contrary?
6. Look for hidden defects (‘ilal) – Subtle issues undermining authenticity.

Summary: The Ibadi Position

The Ibadi position is epistemologically consistent:

1. Certainty is required for theology because it concerns eternal truths.
2. Probability is sufficient for law because law operates in the realm of human affairs.
3. The Qur’an itself demonstrates this principle through its acceptance of witness testimony.
4. Rejecting probability would collapse the legal system entirely.

The Ibadi school thus maintains a dual-track epistemology:

• High epistemic standard for matters of faith.
• Practical epistemic standard for matters of action.

This allows us to preserve certainty in theology while having a functional, comprehensive legal system based on the full range of prophetic traditions.

The following is the respected Shaykh speaking on other matters not related to the above topic. However, we have decided to translate and share what he has said for the benefit of the general readers. The Shaykh is given legal verdicts and answering questions given by students and those who seek knowledge. May Allah (swt) continue to bless the Shaykh and bless others by him.

Shaykh Saeed bin Mabrouk Al-Qanubi (h) fatwa session.

“But I say: the one who does not examine many of these issues may reject some hadiths because he sees them as contradicting what has been settled upon, and he may rule that hadiths are contradictory, and he may blunder about blindly, and take from such [superficial views]. There come those wicked people and say: ‘No problem they all used to perform ablution together. No problem a woman can come with a non-mahram man and do this, uncover her head, do this and that. You are extreme and obstinate! This is the Sunnah of the Prophet (saw), and you claim to follow it, yet you reject those who oppose it, etc., etc.’

It is necessary to know the time in which the Messenger (saw)spoke or did something. Was it before the ruling that is now settled, or not? If we say the first excuse [abrogation], the scholar would not reject that hadith. The second issue is abrogation itself. Yes. He was speaking about the narration of Rabī’ah regarding the issue of [the prohibition of] predatory animals. So how does one respond to this narration? Yes . By reconciling it [with other texts], as we said. If it cannot be reconciled with the Qur’an, then [it may be rejected], but here it can be reconciled. No problem. He says: ‘I do not find in what has been revealed to me anything forbidden…’ yes, at that time there was nothing forbidden except these things, as we know. Even prayer had not yet been prescribed in the form we see today, and fasting had not yet been prescribed in the form it is now, and zakāh had not yet been fully detailed . It was general at the beginning, and jihād was not originally obligatory at all, but rather recommended. Likewise, some things like wine was lawful. Can someone come, for example, and find that Hamzah (may Allah be pleased with him) drank wine, as mentioned in some narrations, and then say that wine is lawful because Hamzah drank it, and that he (Hamzah) could not have done such a thing, and even if we assume he did, why did the Prophet (saw)not rebuke him?

The answer: He drank it at a time when wine had not yet been forbidden. So it is true that it can be said at that time: ‘I do not find it [forbidden]’. Then the prohibition of wine came later. Likewise, in many matters, no one can [ignore this principle]. And this is an issue where some may err regarding certain hadiths. They do not distinguish between what came early and what came later. For example, one finds a report that men and women used to perform ablution together. Someone may come and say: ‘This hadith is not authentic, because it is not possible for a woman to perform ablution with a non-mahram man. She would have to wash her hands, wipe her head, etc.’ But this hadith is not necessarily invalid, because it could be that firstly the report says ‘men and women’ in an absolute or general wording, and this absolute wording is intended to be restricted, or this general wording is intended to be specified. Who were the ones performing ablution together? They were mahrams with their mahrams there is no problem with a wife and her husband, nor with a woman and her brother, son, father, grandfather, grandson, nephew, etc. That is how some scholars interpret it. And some scholars said: Yes, but this was before the hijab was prescribed. But I am not in need of preponderance here.

What I am saying is: the one who does not examine many of these issues may reject some hadiths because he sees them as contradicting what has been settled upon, and he may judge that hadiths contradict each other, and he may blunder about blindly, and take such approaches. Those wicked people come and say: ‘No problem, they all used to perform ablution together. No problem, a woman can come with a non-mahram man and do this, uncover her head, do this and that. You are extreme and obstinate! This is the Sunnah of the Prophet (saw), and you claim to follow it, yet you reject those who oppose it, etc., etc.’ It is necessary to know the time in which the Messenger (saw) spoke or did something. Was it before the ruling that is now settled, or not?

For example, someone comes to the issue of visiting graves: it was permissible, then prohibited, then permitted again. Can someone take a hadith containing the prohibition and go to a man visiting graves and forbid him from doing so, claiming that the Prophet (saw) forbade it? When the Prophet (saw) later permitted it? Likewise, regarding predatory animals with fangs: they were permissible in the past, then later prohibited. Though some scholars say there is no problem with the hadith because the Arabs were not accustomed to eating such animals, so the prohibition came, and Allah said: ‘I do not find in what has been revealed to me anything forbidden to eat except these things…’ And the Arabs originally did not eat these. I am not in need of preponderance between these two views, but I say: the hadith is authentic and established. No problem. And do we say this is from the category of abrogating and abrogated, or not? There is no problem in this, and it requires discussion: what is meant by permissibility here? Is it legal permissibility, or is it permissibility based on the original principle? This then branches into whether it is abrogating/abrogated or not.

Someone may also come to the issue of ‘water is from water’ . This was at a time when a man who came to his wife and did not ejaculate was not required to perform ghusl; ghusl was only required upon ejaculation. Later, ghusl was prescribed generally . Whether the man ejaculated or not. Can someone use the first hadith as evidence and say: ‘Ghusl is required because water is from water,’ and then say: ‘These two hadiths contradict. One says water is from water, and the other says when he sits between her four limbs… look at these contradictory hadiths!’? There is no problem with these hadiths. That was at one time, and this at another. Contradiction only occurs between two matters if they are at the same time. If one informant tells you I was in Muscat yesterday, and another tells you I am in Sinaw today is there contradiction? No, that was at one time, and this at another. But if both informants told you that at the exact same hour, not even the same day, because it could be morning or afternoon; they said I was in Muscat at that exact hour, then we would say this is a contradiction; one of them is mistaken. Either lying or erring. He may have seen my car there (and I have another car) and assumed I was there. This happens.

I remember once someone called wanting to speak to Shaykh Ahmad, and the call was transferred — there were voice recordings of Shaykh Ahmad. When they transferred him, someone in the other location said: ‘Peace be upon you, I wanted Shaykh Ahmad to listen to a lesson with him.’ When he heard that, he assumed Shaykh Ahmad was giving a lesson at that moment. But Shaykh Ahmad may have been traveling to another region of Oman, or even outside Oman. So one person says: ‘I heard Shaykh Ahmad just now in Sinaw giving a lecture,’ and another says: ‘No, Shaykh Ahmad is currently in such-and-such country.’ We say: No, that is wrong. He merely assumed. When he heard that recording, he thought Shaykh Ahmad was currently giving a lesson, but in reality it could have been from 10 or 20 years ago. It was recorded. Or someone saw Shaykh Ahmad’s car driven by someone else coming to the ministry, so he assumed Shaykh Ahmad was there. Such contradictions occur due to error. But if the matter occurred at two different times, there is no contradiction. And this is what abrogation is about: if a ruling was established before, then changed; if it was not previously established, then the first was based on the original principle of permissibility, and the second is a new ruling.

The same applies to domestic donkeys. Initially they were not forbidden, then later forbidden. And the same applies to temporary marriage (mut’ah). It was lawful, then forbidden, and scholars differed on whether it was permitted again then forbidden again. The outcome is that it is now forbidden. Some scholars say it was lawful, then forbidden, then lawful, then forbidden; others say it was lawful, then forbidden. As for the other reconciliation regarding the hadith of Khaybar that mentions that wording there is scrutiny over its authenticity. We do not need to establish that it was lawful at one time and then forbidden. Likewise, predatory animals were lawful at one time according to one view. Though we mentioned there is a view that they were never lawful, but rather were not part of Arab diet, so they were not even mentioned.

The excuse of that scholar or those scholars is that some of them had not come across the hadith at all; some criticized it; some came across it in a wording open to interpretation. Even if one says that prohibition in principle indicates forbiddance. As Shaykh al-Imām al-Sālimī (may Allah have mercy on him) said, and its ruling is forbiddance and permanence. But here there is a contextual indicator that shifts it. However, if someone comes, what should he do? Should he say: ‘I follow such-and-such’? How can you say ‘I follow al-Sālimī’ when you were criticizing this hadith, and you were capable of criticism, or you were not? If he was not capable, why would he criticize it? In reality, he is not capable, or you have something in its text that needs discussion. But if you say: ‘I just follow,’ then we find people like this. They do not distinguish between these matters. Among them are ignorant people, and among them are those with ulterior motives. Authentic, established hadiths from the Prophet (saw)are brought to them, but if they desire a particular matter, they pay no attention except to those hadiths that suit them, claiming: ‘We are followers, and we follow so-and-so scholar, and we are safe — and no scholar has said you are safe by following in such matters.’

Yes, a person may be considered ‘safe’. Consider if a person prays facing the wrong direction, then the matter becomes clear to him. People whose testimony he cannot reject come and say: ‘O so-and-so, you are facing east, and the qiblah is west.’ Is he told ‘you are safe’? Fine . So-and-so, my companion, prayed and finished. How can you say ‘safe’? We say ‘safe’ because the proof had not been established against him. I think this is clear. The proof had not been established that the qiblah was in that direction; he knew the qiblah differently and thought it was that way. So he prayed, no problem. Or if a person performed tayammum and prayed outside. Fine. He prayed and finished, and they said: ‘So-and-so, you prayed. No problem; you don’t have to repeat it.’ This is the well-known correct view. He prayed, but he did tayammum. He must perform wudū’ or ghusl if he was in a state of major impurity, or if a woman was in menstruation or postnatal bleeding, then she must perform ghusl. But that does not mean he is commanded to repeat that prayer. However, tayammum does not suffice when water becomes available it does not suffice. He says: ‘How can you say he is safe? I also did tayammum like he did, he performed the prayer, and may have even died. But you did not perform the prayer because the proof had been established against you. For example, you were informed of the presence of water that you could reach before the prayer time ended, or even if water was available but at an excessive price. Scholars have detailed this issue regarding excessive price or otherwise. The point is: if a person does not intend to oppose [the truth], then here there is a difference.

So if he has come across the hadith but in what form? In a wording that allows interpretation, while it is authentically established in a wording that leaves no room for interpretation. A scholar may come across the hadith but forget it, and this is common, clear, and well-known. For example, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (may Allah be pleased with him) was with ‘Ammār and the Prophet(saw), and they performed tayammum, the Prophet(saw) instructed tayammum for ‘Ammār due to major impurity. But later, when the issue arose again, ‘Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) forbade tayammum. ‘Ammār said: ‘O Commander of the Faithful, do you not remember when we were in such-and-such situation?’ and he reminded him of that incident, and the period between the death of the Prophet (saw) and the death of ‘Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) was only about a year. Even if we say it happened at the end of that period, there is no doubt it happened before. Yet he forgot.

Here, some people may come with ulterior motives and say: ‘Look at ‘Umar! How can he be a Commander of the Faithful and not even understand this matter?’ This is for the wisdom of Allah . A scholar may attain much knowledge, yet subḥān Allāh, some matters are hidden from him. Matters are hidden from those greater than him. One scholar is reported to have delved deeply into the chapter of sales and become very knowledgeable. Then one day a layman came and asked him a question, and he could not answer it. However, someone much less knowledgeable than him in that field answered it. He realized and said: ‘There is a share for the self here’. He had thought he had attained everything, but this is for those who hold themselves accountable in such matters. So no problem. ‘Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) may have forgotten. But how many did he forget? If he forgot one, two, or three hadiths what can be said? He forgot (may Allah be pleased with him), even though ‘Ammār reminded him he reminded him, but ‘Umar did not recall. So what if there is a chain of narration: ‘So-and-so narrated to me from so-and-so from so-and-so…’?

I saw some people criticizing Musnad al-Rabī’ on the grounds that al-Rabī’ did not narrate from Abū ‘Ubaydah, citing that it is narrated from Abū ‘Ubaydah that he denied the prohibition of predatory animals. So how could he deny that while narrating the hadith? This does not impugn Abū ‘Ubaydah — neither his knowledge, nor his narration of the Sunnah, nor the fact that this hadith is narrated through him. It is possible he said that before he came across the hadith; or he came across it and forgot; or other known possibilities. Similar things occurred to other imams of the schools of jurisprudence. It is possible he narrated this hadith after holding that view and then retracted to what he narrated from the hadith. Moreover, that narration from Abū ‘Ubaydah may not be established. Even if found in some fiqh books — because the chain to Abū ‘Ubaydah is not continuous; the one who attributed that statement to Abū ‘Ubaydah may have erred.

As for their claim that they criticized the narrator saying ‘if the narration is authentic’ does that mean they criticized Abū ‘Ubaydah, or Jābir, or Ibn ‘Abbās? No, it does not necessarily mean they criticized any of them. But if the narration is established, it may be said they criticized the narration of that narrator because he erred — even if he was trustworthy. When someone rejects the narration of Ibn ‘Umar (may Allah be pleased with him) when he said ‘the Messenger of Allah (saw) performed ‘umrah in Rajab,’ and ‘Ā’ishah (may Allah be pleased with her) rejected it does that mean she impugned Ibn ‘Umar? No, it impugns his narration, though one might loosely say it impugns the narrator. By this we mean his retention of that particular narration. This is something one should be aware of: when it is said they impugned his memory, it does not mean they impugned his memory absolutely; it means they impugned his retention of that specific narration. This is well-known.

Sometimes, in books of jarḥ wa ta’dīl especially abridgments like al-Mīzān, al-Mughnī, al-Ḍu’afā’, al-Tahdhīb and its branches they abbreviate and do not mention the incident or the reason for the criticism. They simply say ‘they impugned his memory’ meaning his memory for that narration, not absolutely. They may even use expressions that seem to disparage the narrator, though that is not their intent. Similarly, scholars impugned the statement of Ibn ‘Abbās (may Allah be pleased with them both) that the Prophet (saw) married Maymūnah while in iḥrām. They said Ibn ‘Abbās erred. The news reached him about the timing of the marriage, and he assumed the Prophet (saw) married her at that time, while in fact he had married her earlier. When the news reached him, he assumed otherwise and reported accordingly.

From here comes the statement: ‘A solitary hadith does not establish creedal matters.’ They think that when we say this, we are impugning something we are certain came from the Prophet (saw). As some people say: ‘You are rejecting the Messenger of Allah (saw)!’ They say: ‘Whoever rejects the Prophet (saw) is lost and ruined.’ But he (the scholar) is saying: ‘The Prophet (saw)did not say this’ or at least ‘I doubt whether he said it or not.’ He is not saying: ‘The Prophet said it, and I reject his words.’ No Muslim would ever say: ‘O Messenger of Allah, you say such-and-such, but your words carry no weight.’ They should have paid attention to this. But calamity! Whoever is not granted success is in calamity; and its opposite is success. The successful one is guided to good, but the forsaken one is struck with calamity.

So one person, when confronted with the hadith ‘Where is Allah?’ said: ‘You are rejecting the Messenger of Allah (saw)!’ Fine. If we wanted to treat him likewise, we would say: ‘You too, when you narrated this hadith, then Allah willed [otherwise], you said this is a Jewish creed.’ On your own logic, someone can come and say: ‘You are rejecting the Messenger of Allah (saw) and describing his words as a Jewish creed. Meaning he held Jewish beliefs’. Even though the hadith is in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. What is your answer to this?

There is no doubt we do not accuse him of saying ‘the Prophet did not say this’ and this is an error whether from al-Bukhārī, or his shaykh, or his shaykh’s shaykh, or one of the narrators. The Prophet cannot have said it. And we say to you: if so, we also say: ‘Where is Allah?’ This wording was not said by the Prophet (saw) It may be from Muslim, or from Muslim’s shaykh, or from his shaykh’s shaykh. There is no doubt that al-Bukhārī is higher in rank than Muslim, and Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī is higher than Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim. If it is permissible for you to impugn a narration in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, why is it not permissible for us to impugn a narration in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim? What is his answer? Even if he died many years ago, what is the answer of his followers? They make things seem huge, so that some poor student or layperson thinks: ‘This school of thought rejects the Messenger of Allah (saw) and does not accept his words!’ This is flimsy, incoherent talk. No one has ever said this. We do not accuse any Muslim of rejecting a hadith of the Prophet (saw). Rather, we say: a scholar may reject a hadith because it is weak in his view.

They differ on some hadiths. They differ on their indications or even their authenticity. Abrogation in the Qur’an for example. Some scholars differed on whether certain matters are abrogated or not; this indicates prohibition, that indicates recommendation or permissibility, this indicates obligation, that indicates something else. In specifying generalities of the Qur’an, they differed; in restricting, in interpretation, in the meanings of many Qur’anic verses. Anyone who looks at books of tafsīr of rulings knows this. These things may raise some doubts. Not long ago, some people came to me with this doubt They did not know how to respond: ‘How can hadiths be conjectural and we act on conjecture?’ Fine. These rulings are agreed upon by the ummah, and the evidence indicates the authority of the Sunnah. This is a matter definitively established among the ummah. Leave aside those who have no value. But application of some hadiths remains we do not exaggerate the matter. Application in some hadiths this also exists in the case of the Qur’an. Yes, the establishment of the Qur’anic text is definitive, but hadiths differ.

What time is it now? 38 minutes [past]. Usually, how long do they stop? 11:30. So we have about an hour less. The point is: many matters arise. The issue of forgetfulness exists. A scholar may remember a hadith and forget it later. As I mentioned before, even some hadiths in Musnad al-Rabī’ , When Shaykh al-Sālimī (may Allah have mercy on him), Shaykh Abū Nabhān, and Ibn Madād too, regarding some hadiths these are later books. They say: Musnad of Abū Ya’qūb is not sufficient, and scholars for example, if we bring an example from Ibn Barakah, or Abū Sa’īd, or some early scholars they would reject them because they had not seen Musnad al-Rabī’, as it was not available. Fine. SShaykh al-Sālimī saw Musnad al-Rabī’, and Abū Nabhān saw it. When Shaykh al-Sālimī (may Allah have mercy on him) came to the hadith of combining prayers, initially he seemed to want to discuss it, but then he realized the hadith is in the Musnad. You can look at Shaykh al-Imām’s words in al-Ma’ārik this is present. So besides al-Rabī’, a scholar may forget.

Shaykh al-Sālimī (may Allah have mercy on him), despite the closeness of time and his great memory but subḥān Allāh, for a wisdom Allah wills, something like this may occur to a scholar. In al-Ma’ārij, when he came to the issue of facing the qiblah he said it is not a condition for the supererogatory prayer if one is on a mount. And I say: ‘on a mount’ does not necessarily imply restriction, because if he is not on a mount but walking, offering supererogatory prayer facing other than the qiblah there is discussion about this. I do not intend restriction. The question is: when he intends to say the takbīr of iḥrām, should he face the qiblah? If we assume a man is on a camel or a mount and wants to offer supererogatory prayer, is he required to stop the mount or turn it toward the qiblah as it moves, to say the takbīr of iḥrām, and then proceed as he wishes? Or, for example, stop his car facing the qiblah? But in reality, it is not easy for a driver to offer supererogatory prayer. He should occupy himself with listening to the Qur’an, reciting, dhikr, supplication, reflection, and similar acts of worship; and there are many, praise be to Allah.

As for performing prayer with prostration and bowing, this could cause an accident and bring great harm to himself and others . It is not appropriate for a driver. But if we assume two men are traveling, and the one riding beside the driver wants to offer supererogatory prayer is he required to say: ‘Brother, stop the car so I can face the qiblah,’ then say the takbīr of iḥrām and continue on the path he wants? Or is this not required? Four authentic hadiths report that the Prophet (saw) used to offer supererogatory prayer facing other than the qiblah, indicating his bowing and prostration. A narration from Anas ibn Mālik (may Allah be pleased with him) states that the Prophet (saw) used to face the qiblah when intending the takbīr of iḥrām. Some scholars considered this narration sound, others weakened it and the view that it is weak is probably closer to correctness. But this is not the point of evidence. The point is that Shaykh al-Imām al-Sālimī (may Allah have mercy on him) mentioned in al-Ma’ārij the narration indicating this, but in Sharḥ al-Jāmi’  which is later than al-Ma’ārik and close in time he mentioned that there is no narration indicating that. So subḥān Allāh despite the Shaykh’s great memory, for a wisdom Allah wills, something like this may occur.

And also, a scholar may reject a narration because others among the narrators forgot it. A narrator narrates a hadith, ‘So-and-so told us from so-and-so from the Prophet (saw) and then the narrator relates the hadith from that , and later says: ‘I do not remember narrating that hadith to you.’ This is present, like the hadith of the takbīr narrated from Ibn ‘Abbās in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. But this does not harm [the hadith], though some scholars say it does, and they criticize the hadith on that basis. A scholar may also criticize a hadith because it contradicts why? the madhhab of its narrator, or because the narrator contradicted that narration. Here, some scholars say: the criterion is the narrator’s narration, not his opinion that contradicts it. Others say: the criterion is the narrator’s opinion regarding his narration, because a just narrator cannot contradict a hadith he narrated unless that hadith is interpreted or carried upon other than its apparent meaning. In reality, we say: the matter requires some examination and scrutiny when judging each narration.

First, we need to examine the chain of the opinion attributed to that narrator, and also examine the chain of the narration he narrated. In many narrations, we find a narrator narrating a hadith, yet an opinion contrary to it is attributed to him; but that opinion attributed to him is not established from him. So here, there is no contradiction between his narration and his opinion; because that opinion is not authentically established from that Companion or that narrator (if non-Companion) for us to say: ‘We take the narrator’s opinion or his narration,’ because in reality it is only a narration, and the madhhab attributed to him is not authentic from him.

The opposite may also occur: the narration is not established, and the opinion attributed to him is what is authentically established from him. An example is the issue narrated from Ibn ‘Abbās (may Allah be pleased with him) that divorce during the time of the Prophet (saw) three divorces counted as one. The narration is not authentic; rather it is weak. And the authentic view of Ibn ‘Abbās is that it counts as three. Someone might say: ‘How can Ibn ‘Abbās contradict his own narration?’ If both the opinion and the narration were authentic, we could examine and say: perhaps Ibn ‘Abbās knew this was initially the case, then abrogated. But we say: there is no abrogation here. The narration is not authentic, and the opinion is the correct one. So we must look: if the opinion is correct and the narration is correct, then we need to study the matter because it is possible the narrator abandoned it out of forgetfulness and absent-mindedness, narrated it long ago, then forgot and said otherwise. It is also possible he held that opinion first, then later narrated the hadith as we mentioned regarding Abū ‘Ubaydah (may Allah have mercy on him). It is also possible he understood it first, and then we look at his interpretation is it correct or not? Or he may have said it was abrogated, or specified, or restricted and then we examine. It may be said: his excuse is the context of this narration, which led him to his view. Or it may be said: he is a mujtahid like other mujtahids we look at his narration; if his opinion aligns with the correct meaning of the narration, we take it; otherwise, no.

This of course requires examples, but for now, you have the issue of wiping over leather socks (khuffayn) Abū Hurayrah is reported to have narrated that the Prophet (saw) wiped over them, but scholars said this narration is not established because it is authentically reported from Abū Hurayrah that he denied wiping over them, and that narration is not authentic from him. So we do not take his opinion nor his narration because his narration is not authentic. Similarly, Ibn ‘Umar narrated wiping over khuffayn from the Prophet (saw), but it is authentically established from him that he said otherwise. The narration he narrated is not authentic. This may actually yield a useful point: these Companions did not narrate wiping over khuffayn from the Prophet (saw). As for Ibn ‘Umar, it is possible likewise; and Abū Hurayrah embraced Islam late, so this may indicate as some of our scholars said that wiping over khuffayn was early, before Sūrat al-Mā’idah. There remains the issue of Jarīr, did he embrace Islam after Sūrat al-Mā’idah? This needs examination; it is possible Jarīr heard part of al-Mā’idah and the whole sūrah does not necessarily have to have been revealed at one time; al-Baqarah, for example, was not revealed at one time. He may have assumed it was revealed later among other possibilities. In any case, a narrator is fallible. He may be correct or err. I am not here to settle this issue, though you may say wiping over khuffayn is not established at this time because the verse explicitly commands washing the feet.

So in such cases, we must ascertain whether the narrator’s narration is established and whether the narrator’s opinion is established and then judge each case individually. A narrator may reject a narration because he thinks it contradicts consensus. How can a narration be rejected for contradicting consensus? Can the Prophet’s (saw) saying be rejected by consensus of people? Here we say, as we said regarding the issue of rejecting a hadith that contradicts the Qur’an: we understand from this that the hadith is not authentic because if it were authentic, it would not contradict the Qur’an and the Prophet (saw) cannot say something contrary to the Qur’an; that can never happen. Here too, a hadith may appear authentic in its chain, but when the ummah has agreed upon the contrary, that indicates to us that this hadith is either abrogated, interpreted, restricted, specified, or weak, even if its chain appears sound; because trustworthiness of men and their precision are conditions for authenticity, and continuity of chain is also a condition. The presence of these conditions does not mean all conditions have been met; we must examine the remaining conditions to judge the hadith authentic.

It may be said: the default is that if the chain is continuous, the conditions of trustworthiness and precision are met, and there are no hidden defects (‘ilal) that undermine its establishment then yes, it is established in principle. But when the ummah has agreed on the contrary, this indicates a hidden defect that must be sought; if we can identify it, fine; if not, we are certain of it without pinpointing the exact defect. This is well-known in the statements of scholars no one denies it.

However, there remains an obstacle: we must be sure of the authenticity of this consensus. How many narrations have been claimed to contradict consensus, yet that consensus turned out to be an illusion. The consensus was not established? This is an important point that a student of knowledge should pay attention to: not everything attributed to scholars is authentically from them. How many narrations in creed, worship, transactions, and other areas have been attributed to some scholars yet they never heard of them in their lives? For example, you find attributed to Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq that he said such-and-such regarding the vision [of Allah]; it is attributed indeed, it is said all the Companions agreed on it, and even the prophets and messengers agreed but in reality these narrations are not authentic. So if someone comes with such an attribution that many people claim, we must be cautious.

Therefore, when we encounter a purported consensus, we must reflect: how many claimed consensuses are not authentic? And how many opinions attributed to a scholar or to scholars are not authentic from them at all? Here, especially when we find some narrations contradict some claimed consensuses or rather, those consensuses contradict these narrations we must examine and scrutinize. Some of these narrations, as I said, may not be authentic from them. At the same time, we find some consensuses to be authentic, but we find some people attributing to certain scholars the contrary opinion to those consensuses. Consequently, some people follow those who differed, saying: ‘This issue is not agreed upon, and I take the view of so-and-so’ as we said earlier, those who take the view of al-Sālimī. And we said this statement is not absolutely correct they make the disagreement the arbiter over the legal evidence, whereas Allah commanded us when differing to refer the disagreement to the legal evidence meainng: to the Book and the Sunnah of the Prophet (saw). He commanded us to refer it to Allah and His Messenger. Referring to Allah is referring to His Book, and referring to His Messenger is referring to his Sunnah(saw). We do not make disagreement the arbiter even when the disagreement is valid; so what if the disagreement is not valid, and the ummah is actually agreed?

When we find, for example, the issue of musical instruments of which more than 30 scholars have reported consensus on its prohibition. Yet some people come and say: ‘I follow so-and-so and so-and-so.’ This is not established from them at all. We must also note that some of those to whom such opinions are attributed are not qualified mujtahids. Even if authentically attributed to them. Some of them may have been hasty in their early days, or they may have thought there was no consensus when the matter is actually agreed upon. So we must be cautious in such matters. Not every consensus is authentic, and not every disagreement is valid. One must pay attention to these issues.

There are scholars known for reporting consensuses; many matters are subject to disagreement for many reasons. I have pointed to some, and there are reasons I cannot point to now. But students must be aware of these. I am not saying this now, but when you study, whether in university studies or later, even if only to a limited degree, a person should know why scholars differed and how to stand when there is disagreement among scholars, how to stand regarding the mujtahids, and regarding the followers (muqallids) who follow those scholars.

Followers themselves are of different types. Some are laymen who cannot read or write . When you try to ask about the simplest matter, they do not understand. If such a person says: ‘I follow so-and-so,’ and you say to him: ‘This hadith is narrated by al-Rabī’ and by Abū ‘Ubaydah,’ and he says: ‘I don’t know what al-Rabī’ narrated or what Abū ‘Ubaydah narrated’ fine. If such a person follows a scholar in a matter, one should try to explain to him, but sometimes it does not become clear.

I recall a story: someone heard a sermon or lesson in which the speaker said: ‘When a person wants to slaughter, he must say bismillāh it is obligatory and Allāhu akbar is recommended.’ So when that person went to slaughter, he said: ‘Bismillāh obligatory, Allāhu akbar recommended.’ The speaker had intended to explain that basmalah is obligatory meaning one cannot slaughter without saying bismillāh, and the meat is forbidden to eat if the basmalah was omitted, whether intentionally or forgetfully while takbīr is not obligatory but recommended; if omitted, there is no harm. But this person did not understand; he thought he had to say the words ‘bismillāh obligatory and Allāhu akbar recommended.’ So what can you do with such laymen? If a layman hears something from Shaykh so-and-so, and when told otherwise, he may say: ‘Shaykh so-and-so said this; he would not abandon a hadith, he is the one who can [evaluate].’ But sometimes, when he understands, he may. A student of knowledge is different from such a layman. As for laymen, one must see why he differed and if the understanding can be corrected, one tries. And inshallah, laymen are more accommodating than some people with ulterior motives.

The point is: there are matters that may relate to the chain of transmission or to the text that may lead one to reject a hadith and they are many. But I will suffice with this for now.”

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